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market policies (ALMP) for disadvantaged unemployed. The literature on the efficiency of 
contracting-out ALMP services by public institutions is not consistent. Formalism and 
limited scope of possible actions in public institutions stand in the way to activation of the 
less promising unemployed. On the other hand, contracted-out companies work as a black-
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1. Introduction 
 
All over the world, but particularly in the European Union, considerable sums are 
allocated to active labour market policies (ALMPs) every year, however efficiency 
of public spending is neither secured, nor properly evaluated. In Poland, in the years 
2010-2015, 1.6 billion euros were spent annually to support this aim (Eurostat, 
2017). However, the impact of these investments is not sufficiently scrutinized. 
Programmes are usually evaluated using misleading methods (the before-and-after 
method, comparisons of basic statistics across regions, or simply enumerating the 
services provided). This leads to lack of evidence on real efficiency of ALMPs. Only 
a few evaluation studies, out of a dozen requested by Labour Offices and institutions 
distributing European funds, rely on counterfactual methods. The huge amounts and 
importance of ALMP programs for the economy and society make the issue of the 
effectiveness of programs supporting the activation of the unemployed, one of the 
overriding problems of the labour market policy. 
 
In this paper, we present evidence for the impact on unemployed of contracting out 
ALMP services, from the very first RCT evaluation of the ALMP programme in 
Poland3. The programme evaluated relied on private agencies who provided 
contracted services for the unemployed. The programme was run from 2015 to 2017 
in the Małopolskie Voivodeship (province) of Poland.  
 
Poland’s programme of contracting-out counselling services for the unemployed 
reflects a common trend of increasing reliance on private service providers. The 
majority of ALMP interventions are conducted by Labour Offices (LOs); however, 
as Finn (2011) points out, they are increasingly outsourced to private companies. 
While many studies assess the effectiveness of various ALMPs, relatively few 
compare the effectiveness of ALMP interventions provided by public institutions to 
those outsourced to private companies. This study thus contributes to the literature 
by evaluating a large-scale programme of this type. The major difference between 
the public and private providers are: 
  
1)  flexibility of ALMP tools by private providers (while public LOs can use limited 
catalogue of interventions);  
2) incentives compatibility, as the income for out-sourced companies depends on 
professional success of unemployed.  
 
 
3Interestingly, this RCT evaluation was not planned. Randomized choice of participants was 
used to avoid selection of the most difficult cases for the programme, and this was enforced 
by the Regional Labour Office. This opened ex post a possibility to evaluate the programme 
through an experimental study. The possibility of RCT evaluation was discovered during 
World Bank training: Capacity Building workshop on Impact Evaluation of Employment 
Programs, June 5-8, 2017. 
T. Gajderowicz, M. Jakubowski 
 
 334  
 
 
The intervention assumed lack of formalism and detailed controlling  - contracted 
companies were just forced to assure basic catalogue of services for each 
unemployed, these were: 
  
1) assessment of the professional potential and plan for the career;  
2) individual counselling;  
3) access to computers with internet;  
4) access to the information on the progress;  
5) flexible forms of contracting unemployed. Indeed, contracted companies relayed 
mainly on careful tutoring and identifying and overcoming barriers to employment, 
on the individual level.    
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Theoretically, there are many potential benefits, and reasons for the growing interest, 
in contracting-out ALMP services. First, it is recognized that private companies are 
more flexible and service-oriented than public institutions (Bernhard and Wolff, 
2008) and have a stronger motivation to invest in cost-saving technologies and 
innovations that improve the quality of services provided (Bennmarker et al., 2013). 
Secondly, public institutions can use private companies to expand the range of 
services provided, use the specialist skills of potential suppliers, and provide access 
to services not available in the public sector (Finn, 2011). State agencies are not 
subject to pressure from competition, which means that they are not motivated to 
control costs, provide high-quality services or respond to the needs and requirements 
of consumers (Grout and Stevens, 2003). The efficiency of public versus private 
support schemes was examined by Hasluck et al. (2013); Hales et al. (2003); 
Bernhard and Wolff (2008); Behaghel et al. (2014); Bennmarker et al. (2013); Laun 
and Thoursie (2014). Results are not consistent and show that ALMP instruments 
exhibit different levels of efficiency under different support regimes.  
 
The efficiency of using private contractors in the example of Employment Zones in 
Great Britain has been demonstrated by, among others, Hasluck et al. (2003); Hales 
et al. (2003); Brutell (2005). According to Hasluck et al. (2003) unemployment in 
Employment Zones fell faster than in the other areas compared. Also, people from 
the Employment Zone who found a job were less likely to return to unemployment. 
Hales' research (2003) found that, a year after eligibility, respectively 34% and 24% 
of people in Employment Zones and compared areas were in work for a certain 
period. As pointed out by Rehwald et al. (2017) and Bennmarker et al. (2013), 
private providers have more frequent meetings and deliver prompter, more intense 
and employment-oriented services. Moreover, job-seekers were more satisfied with 
private providers (compared to public ones), applied for more positions, and were 
more often invited to interviews. People using Public Employment Services (PES), 
however, spend more time on job training and internships. 
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On the other hand, a huge body of work on the effectiveness of outsourcing ALMP 
services in comparison to the provision of services by public job centres indicates 
the advantage of the latter. Public service schemes are at least as good as private 
service provision (Behaghel et al., 2014; Bennmarker et al., 2013; Krug and 
Stephan, 2013; Laun and Thoursie, 2014). Behaghel et al. (2014) examined the 
effectiveness of job search counselling by dividing the unemployed into three 
groups: a group of people getting standard services provided by Public Employment 
Services (PES) and two groups that were randomly assigned to the public and 
private intensive ALMP programmes. Both intensive programmes proved to have a 
positive impact. However, the services of public providers were more effective than 
those of private contractors, particularly in the short term. Also, the study showed 
that a private programme is not cost-effective, leads to an increase in costs per job-
seeker, while a public programme reduces costs. 
 
In some studies, the authors found contracting-out had a conditional positive effect, 
but only for groups of people facing the greatest difficulties in finding a job. For 
example, Bernhard and Wolff (2008), using propensity score matching, showed that 
contracted-out employment services tend to be more effective for particular social 
groups (e.g., migrants and females over 49 from Western Germany, and people 
without qualifications and men under 25 from Eastern Germany). Winterhager 
(2006a; 2006b) came to similar conclusions. In Western Germany, only women, 
older people and those entering the labour market gained an advantage using private 
companies as ALMP services provider. For others, use of private service providers 
resulted in lower chances in getting a job. 
 
Laun and Thoursie (2014) did not prove any difference between the situations when 
employment services are delivered through public and private organizations. 
Rehwald et al. (2017) also found no difference in labour market outcomes; however, 
private ALMP proved to be more expensive. Bennmarker et al. (2013) also did not 
prove any difference in the probability of finding a job in any of three groups they 
studied (unemployed under the age of 25, immigrants, disabled). The above studies 
indicate that, contrary to the expectations of researchers, the services provided by 
public institutions are generally more effective compared to those provided by 
private companies. If the study showed contracting-out had a positive impact, it was 
usually for groups of people facing the biggest problems in finding a job. As Finn 
(2011) points out, managing the system of subcontractors is a complex task, and 
takes time to learn to manage efficiently. The author suggests that financial benefits 
from contracting-out services may appear in time. The success of this kind of policy 
depends on mechanism design and the implementation of contractual arrangements.     
 
3. The Intervention: Contracting-out Services for Unemployed 
 
The intervention known as “contracting-out counselling services” was one of the 
first projects in Poland that allowed outsourcing of private counselling services by 
Labour Offices. The programme provided a lot of flexibility in performing 
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contracted tasks. Private companies were paid a success fee and were free to decide 
what kind of services to provide to each unemployed person, while beneficiaries 
were given a profile by the LO. The programme was designed for unemployed 
people who were to some extent disadvantaged in the labour market (with less 
promising profiles)4. Eligibility criteria were as follows: 
 
➢ being unemployed for more than 12 months in the two years before the start 
of the programme; 
➢ being in profile II or III, according to the official profiling tool.  
 
Interventions had already taken place twice: in the Małopolskie Voivodeship these 
were in January 2015 – November 2016, and April 2016 – December 2017. The 
programme was suspended after the first two interventions. The decision resulted 
from an internal report that reviewed basic statistics and official opinions across 
Poland. In fact, in many regions, basic data suggested that the programme was 
unsuccessful, but this could have been entirely due to poor selection for the 
programme. Anecdotal evidence is that LOs in some regions were assigning the 
most difficult cases to demonstrate that private agencies could not outperform their 
services. If this was true, the programme would appear to be highly ineffective, 
especially when the whole evaluation was based on simple comparisons between the 
situations of the unemployed receiving the LOs’ services and those who were 
assigned to private agencies for support. 
 
As mentioned above, in Małopolskie Voivodeship the programme was implemented 
in a specific manner. The Regional Labour Office (RLO) required local offices to 
randomly assign participants and even offered a tool for random assignment (an 
Excel file with step-by-step instructions). The randomization process was 
implemented and monitored by officials from the RLO. In this way, contracted 
private agencies were provided with cases similar to those that were left within local 
LOs. Random assignment was conducted at the Powiat (district) level and within 
groups defined by participants’ age (under and over 25) and unemployment profile 
(II and III).  
 
This paper provides an evaluation of the first edition of the intervention (2015-2016) 
that was conducted in four Powiat LOs. The programme was supervised, and the 
RLO collected the data in Kraków. The data were collected in late 2017, allowing 
 
4In Poland each unemployed person is, based on information provided, given one of three 
profiles (on the basis of the quantitative score). Briefly, profile I includes highly motivated 
people, with professional qualifications and appropriate skills, assumed not to need intensive 
support. LOs offer them some forms of support. Profile II includes those who have some 
professional skills but for whom there is no demand in the labour market. The LO can offer 
these people a wide range of ALMPs. Those who are given profile III, meanwhile, have a 
poor chance of entering the labour market – for many possible reasons. LOs can offer them 
very little help. (MLSP, 2014). 
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evaluation of the outcomes of the programme during 12 months after the official end 
of the first session. 
 
4. Data and Methods 
 
4.1 Methodological Issues 
 
The main source of data gathered to assess the efficiency of contracting-out ALMP 
is the Syriusz System. Syriusz serves as a fundamental tool for Powiat LOs and is 
used to store data about the unemployed. However, Syriusz has hardly ever been 
used for quantitative analysis as it is difficult to extract data from it. In cooperation 
with our partners from Regional Labour Offices, we extracted data using SQL 
source codes. The initial data base was spitted into number of not consistent files, 
with not consistent codding of events, dates and even personal data. The extracted 
data needed substantial cleansing, recoding merging and constructing of final 
variables for the analysis.  
 
Unemployed participants in the project were randomly assigned from the list of all 
eligible unemployed registered in LOs. We identified 2,171 beneficiaries of the 
intervention (Treatment group) who were randomly assigned and 18,979 individuals 
who were randomly assigned to the Control group. As outcomes we measured: 
  
➢ duration of registered unemployment for the last six, nine and 12 months 
before data collection (before October 2017);  
➢ the share of unemployed who again registered in LO during the last six, nine 
and 12 months before data collection. 
 
We extracted a set of personal characteristics to check random assignment quality 
and estimate differences in the impact of the programme for different groups of 
unemployed. Duration of registered unemployment was measured as the total of all 
sub-periods for each individual, as shown in Figure 1. In each case, when, for 
example, looking at the last six months before data collection, only the duration 
between the two dashed lines was counted as the outcome. Thus, we extracted from 
the data the number of days for participants who registered before the six-month 
period and continued to be unemployed; for those who registered several times 
during that period; and also for those who registered just before data collection and 
remained on the register. 
  
Four Powiat LOs participated in the project in the first round. Random assignment 
was conducted separately in each LO using the following strata: 
 
• Young profile II unemployed (under 25); 
• Older profile II unemployed (25 and over); 
• Young profile III unemployed (under 25); 
• Older profile III unemployed (25 and over). 
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Figure 1. Examples of calculations of the duration of registered unemployment for 
the last six, nine and 12 months before data collection (October 2017)  
 
 
Thus, participants were randomly selected from 16 separate lists (four strata in each 
Powiat LO). In some strata, the low number of individuals did not allow quantitative 
analysis, especially among young unemployed with profile III (the smallest stratum 
had 48 participants only). Also, as the number of participants from each stratum was 
determined before the intervention, the assignment of participants was not 
proportional to the target population structure. In the two smallest strata, Treated (T) 
is larger than Controls (C), while in other cases C is larger than T (see detailed data 
in Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Number of Treated (T) and Controls (C) in each randomization stratum 
Source: Own calculations based on the Syriusz data. 
 
Powiat  
code 
Randomization  
group 
C T C+T T as a share 
 of C+T 
% of the  
total sample 
1201 under 25, profile II 297 30 327 9.2% 1.5% 
under 25, profile III 7 41 48 85.4% 0.2% 
over 25, profile II 999 128 1127 11.4% 5.3% 
over 25, profile III 305 150 455 33.0% 2.2% 
1206 under 25, profile II 383 36 419 8.6% 2.0% 
under 25, profile III 46 56 102 54.9% 0.5% 
over 25, profile II 1892 144 2036 7.1% 9.6% 
over 25, profile III 1246 166 1412 11.8% 6.7% 
1211 under 25, profile II 768 40 808 5.0% 3.8% 
under 25, profile III 186 55 241 22.8% 1.1% 
over 25, profile II 2037 167 2204 7.6% 10.4% 
over 25, profile III 1362 171 1533 11.2% 7.2% 
1261 under 25, profile II 225 116 341 34.0% 1.6% 
under 25, profile III 59 123 182 67.6% 0.9% 
over 25, profile II 6296 374 6670 5.6% 31.5% 
over 25, profile III 2871 374 3245 11.5% 15.3% 
Total 18979 2171 21150 10.3% 100.0% 
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In principle, random assignment was conducted using the list of all eligible 
unemployed and prepared templates provided by the Regional Labour Office in 
Kraków. This algorithm of assignment aimed to limit the possibility of assigning 
participants based on their probability of success in the labour market. LOs were 
allowed to replace randomly assigned participants only in cases when the latter did 
not agree to participate in the project. Replacements were taken from a randomly 
sorted list of all those eligible. Unfortunately, most of the source Excel sheets are 
missing. The lists of randomly assigned participants were not collected immediately 
after randomization and had to be recovered from historical Syriusz data from 
October-November 2017. Reconstruction of initial random assignment lists was the 
most demanding task of analysis. 
 
In the first stage of our analysis, we checked if the participants were indeed 
randomly assigned by comparing their key characteristics between Treated and 
Controls. Using Syriusz data we checked balance across Treated and Controls using 
education level (recoded into four levels), gender (0/1), civil status (married/single), 
disability (0/1), number of children, age, and number of days on the LO register over 
the two years before the project. Covariates imbalance analysis is described under 
“Robustness checks” below. 
 
5. Results 
 
Our analysis focuses on a comparison of the number of days in registered 
unemployment after the intervention. For some comparisons, we also use a 
simplified binary indicator showing a share of Treated and Controls who again 
registered as unemployed after the intervention. We looked at these outcomes for 
three periods: for the 12, nine and six months before the final data collection date 
(November 2017). We constructed our outcome variables backward from the final 
data collection date because the exact final date of the intervention was slightly 
different for each participant.  
 
Table 2 compares an average number of days in registered unemployment before 
and after the intervention. Calculations are based on the whole available sample, 
which gives a total of 21,150 observations (2,171 Treated and 18,979 Controls). The 
first comparison in the table confirms that Treated and Controls both came from the 
same group of unemployed and were randomly assigned. This step was particularly 
important as it justified the process of randomization. In fact, before the 
intervention, there is no difference in the number of days in registered 
unemployment between the two groups. However, there are statistical differences 
when the same groups are compared after the intervention. Treated unemployed 
spend on average 30 days less during the last 12 months before data collection. The 
difference is statistically significant (at the 1% significance level) and, thanks to a 
large sample, precisely estimated. The difference is smaller for the shorter periods of 
nine and six months before data collection – 19 days less and 12 days less, 
respectively, with all differences estimated precisely.  
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Table 2. Average number of days in registered unemployment before and after 
intervention 
 
Group 
Before the 
intervention 
After the intervention 
(months before 1.10.2017) 
24 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
Controls 630.2 65.0 101.3 140.8 
Treated 630.8 53.1 81.8 110.9 
Difference 
 (T-C) 
0.5 
(2.7) 
-11.9 
(1.9) 
-19.5 
(2.7) 
-29.9 
(3.6) 
Source: Own calculations based on the Syriusz data. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The results above suggest that the impact of the intervention is positive, but tends to 
diminish over time. Figure 1 compares average days in registered unemployment in 
20-day periods before and after the intervention until data collection. The 
intervention started on the 15th of January 2015, which is close to 1,000 days (or 50 
20-day periods) before data collection on the 1st of October 2017 (988 days exactly). 
It finished in October 2016. The starting date of the intervention is shown by a 
dashed green line, the end date is by a dashed red line (as mentioned above, not all 
participants started and finished on exactly the same day). In the dataset, fewer than 
10 participants out of more than 2,171 Treated were still receiving support after the 
official end of the project (red vertical line in figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 also shows the difference in the average days between Treated and Controls 
(Treated minus Controls). The impact of the intervention is positive and decreases 
the number of days in registered unemployment. The difference in number of days is 
close to zero at the beginning and increases to reach a maximum of four days per 20-
day period on average around 34th and 35th period. After that it declines, but at the 
time of data collection it is still negative, meaning that Treated are in registered 
unemployment for a smaller number of days on average. 
 
Figure 2. Average number of days of registered unemployment in 20-day periods 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Syriusz data. See Table A1 with detailed data in the 
Annex. 
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The overall impact can also be shown by comparing the percentages of people who, 
after the intervention, at any point registered again as unemployed (or did not leave 
the register). During the 12 months before data collection, 53.8% of Controls 
registered as unemployed compared to 44.5% among the Treated, giving a difference 
of more than nine percentage points. These numbers do vary, however, within 
groups of participants.  
 
Figure 3 compares the percentages of people who registered as unemployed among 
Treated and Controls on average, but also within four groups in which random 
assignment was conducted: young (under 25) and older (over 25) unemployed 
classified as profile II or III (see Table 3 for detailed results). These groups are 
important as there are different LO actions prescribed for each group. The crucial 
difference is that profile III unemployed typically do not receive any support unless 
there is a special programme like the one we are analysing here. Thus, for this group, 
the impact evaluation compares (an almost total) lack of support with the outsourced 
“black box” support received during the intervention. The profile II group receives 
typical support from LOs. Thus, for this group, the impact evaluation compares 
support from LOs to the support provided by private agencies.  
 
Figure 3 shows a much larger impact for the profile III unemployed, especially those 
over 25. On one hand this is not surprising, as without the intervention this group is 
receiving very limited support. On the other hand it shows that, despite the 
assumption that this group lacks any reasonable employment perspective, our impact 
evaluation demonstrates large benefits from privately provided assistance. In effect, 
among Treated unemployed over 25, those with profile III have a similar probability 
of going back on the register as those with profile II (43% with profile II return, 
compared to 46% with profile III). This contrasts with the unemployed in the 
Control group, where 65% of those over 25 and with profile III return to the register 
compared to only 52% among those over 25 and with profile II. This suggests that 
the intervention is more effective in profile III and among older unemployed, 
although Figure 2 also shows the intervention has positive effects even in the group 
under 25, but in profile III only. 
 
A more detailed analysis suggests that the impact of the intervention increases with 
age, but this effect varies by unemployment profile and by gender (see Table 3 for 
detailed results). Figure 4 shows the average days of registered unemployment 
separately for those in profile II and III categories. In each category, separate lines 
by treatment status and gender are shown over age. For the Control group, the 
probability of returning to the register increases with age, while in profile II the 
probability of returning is smaller than in profile III, and is also larger for women. 
Among the Treated, the effect of age is much smaller, and differences between 
genders are less clear.  
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Table 3. Detailed results for the whole sample and subgroups 
  
Average number of days on 
the register 
Percentage of those who returned 
to the register 
 C T T-C S.E. C T T-C S.E. 
Full sample 
under 25, profile II 69.4 71.4 2.1 8.6 36.4% 37.8% 1.4% 3.4% 
under 25, profile III 126.5 118.4 -8.2 12.6 55.4% 49.5% -5.9% 4.2% 
over 25, profile II 130.3 108.6 -21.7 5.6 51.6% 43.2% -8.4% 1.8% 
over 25, profile III 182.5 120.9 -61.6 5.9 64.8% 45.9% -18.9% 1.8% 
Men 
under 25, profile II 55.4 61.7 6.4 10.4 32.3% 37.5% 5.2% 4.6% 
under 25, profile III 88.2 83.9 -4.4 17.6 45.0% 38.6% -6.4% 6.6% 
over 25, profile II 130.7 117.9 -12.8 7.9 52.8% 45.7% -7.1% 2.6% 
over 25, profile III 183.5 131.0 -52.5 8.2 65.3% 50.9% -14.4% 2.4% 
Women 
under 25, profile II 81.4 82.9 1.5 13.6 39.9% 38.2% -1.7% 5.1% 
under 25, profile III 155.8 138.4 -17.4 16.9 63.3% 55.7% -7.6% 5.3% 
over 25, profile II 129.9 99.7 -30.2 7.9 50.5% 40.7% -9.8% 2.5% 
over 25, profile III 181.6 109.7 -71.9 8.6 64.4% 40.3% -24.1% 2.5% 
by education level 
primary or lower 
secondary 154.5 135.7 -18.9 6.5 59.9% 53.4% -6.5% 2.0% 
basic vocational 139.9 102.5 -37.4 6.9 54.9% 41.2% -13.7% 2.2% 
secondary vocational 134.5 80.0 -54.5 8.9 50.9% 33.6% -17.3% 2.8% 
secondary general and 
post-secondary 134.3 112.6 -21.7 8.8 52.3% 46.4% -5.9% 2.8% 
tertiary 132.8 105.2 -27.6 10.7 50.3% 40.6% -9.7% 3.4% 
by length of previous unemployment (24 months before the intervention) 
less than 24 months 113.4 97.4 -16.0 4.6 48.3% 42.7% -5.6% 1.6% 
full 24 months 171.8 124.8 -47.0 5.3 61.2% 46.4% -14.8% 1.6% 
Source: Own calculations based on the Syriusz data. 
 
Figure 3. Percentages of Controls and Treated who registered as unemployed after 
the intervention: on average and by profile and age groups 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Syriusz data. 
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Figure 4. Average days in unemployment register by age, profile group and gender 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Syriusz data. 
 
Impact of the intervention also varies by education level, with the unemployed 
having vocational (in particular secondary vocational) education benefiting from the 
strongest positive effects of the intervention. The difference between Treated and 
Controls in the average number of days in registered unemployment in the last 12 
months before data collection was negative for all education levels, meaning the 
impact of the intervention was on average positive in all cases. However, this 
difference was around 54 days for those with secondary education, 37 days for those 
with basic vocational education, 28 days for those with tertiary education and around 
20 days for those with post-secondary or basic or lower secondary education (see 
Table A3 in the Annex for detailed results). 
 
Finally, the intervention also has more profound effects for the long-term 
unemployed. Among those eligible for the intervention but who were registered for a 
full 24 months before the intervention, in the Control group 61% again registered as 
unemployed during the 12 months before data collection compared to 46% in the 
Treated group. Among those eligible who experienced some periods of employment 
in the two years before the intervention, in the Control group 48% registered again 
compared to 43% in the Treated group. Thus, the difference is 15% for those with a 
long-term, uninterrupted unemployment history, while for those with a short-term 
unemployment history it is only 5%. 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
 
First, we checked whether the Treated and Control groups both had balanced 
characteristics regarding additional covariates. We ran 16 logit regressions 
separately for each stratum in which randomization was conducted. We found only 
small differences in some strata related to an imbalance of education level (in two 
strata), number of children, civil status and number of days in registered 
unemployment before the intervention (each in one stratum).  
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We conducted robustness checks to see if the results would change with additional 
correction using propensity score matching (PSM), balancing key characteristics 
between Treated and Controls. When using the full sample, we found some 
imbalances which are due not to poor random assignment but mainly to imbalance in 
the number of participants in each stratum, which results in imbalance in age, 
unemployment profile and related characteristics like education level (see propensity 
score test results in Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Propensity score balance test 
Variable Treated       Control % bias  p>t V(T)/V(C) 
education level 2.4993       2.7063 -15 0.000 0.92* 
gender (female=1) 0.50668       0.50761 -0.2 0.934 . 
married=1 0.43482       0.47753 -8.6 0.000 . 
special needs 0.08291       0.08035 0.9 0.678 . 
number of children 0.79322        0.7449 4 0.083 1.09* 
age 40.277         42.362 -15.8 0.000 1.19* 
days on register 
before intervention 630.76       630.25 0.4 0.853 1.02 
Source: Own calculations based on the Syriusz data. 
 
However, a PSM estimate for the full sample gives results that are very close to 
those obtained with experimental data without PSM (see Table 5). This suggests that 
these small imbalances in covariates do not affect estimates of treatment effect.  
 
Table 5. Propensity score matching adjusted estimates of the average number of 
days in registered unemployment (in comparison to results in Table 2) 
Period Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
6 months Unmatched 54.7 67.2 -12.6 1.9 6.46 
ATT 54.7 68.8 -14.1 3.0 4.71 
9 months Unmatched 84.2 104.6 -20.5 2.8 7.22 
ATT 84.2 107.8 -23.7 4.4 5.41 
12 months Unmatched 113.8 145.3 -31.5 3.7 8.48 
ATT 113.8 149.0 -35.2 5.7 6.14 
Note: Single nearest-neighbour method. Sample size of 19,796 observations is lower than for 
the main estimates in Table 2 due to missing data on some covariates. 
Source: Own calculations based on the Syriusz data. 
 
Finally, we conducted PSM on key covariates (education level, gender, civil status, 
number of children, special needs status, number of days in registered 
unemployment before the intervention) separately in each stratum and compared 
them to treatment effects estimates before matching. The results were nearly 
identical with a PSM-adjusted ATT estimate of around 34.3 days less in registered 
unemployment during the last 12 months before data collection compared to the 
unadjusted ATT estimate of 31 days. 
 
What Works for Disadvantaged Unemployed: Private or Public ALMP Services?  
Evidence from Poland   
345  
7. Discussion 
 
This paper compares the effectiveness of public instruments with private services. 
The results clearly show the positive impact of the latter. The reasons for that can be 
found in differences in flexibility of tools and system of counsellor incentives. LOs 
have very limited freedom in offering services. For the profile II unemployed, an LO 
can use available (but precisely defined) instruments, however for profile III 
unemployed the LO is hardly allowed to provide any services. At the same time, 
contracted private providers had freedom with the tools they used and were just 
forced to assure basic catalogue of services for each unemployed. The intervention 
assumed lack of formalism and just basic controlling of agencies. Not less important 
is incentive compatibility of counsellors, as the revenue for out-sourced companies 
depended on real professional success of unemployed. Incentive compatibility 
mechanisms are almost lacking in the public LOs. 
 
The strongest positive effect of support provided by contracted private agencies was 
found to be among the most dismissed groups of the unemployed. The positive 
effects of outsourcing services on LOs clients are especially strong for older 
unemployed people and those with profile III. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
programme is more effective for women and unemployed people with vocational 
education, especially secondary vocational education. As mentioned, within this 
group, under present law, LOs have very limited instruments at their disposal. The 
strong positive effect lessens when we compare the impacts within the profile II 
group of unemployed. This group receives regulated by law support from LOs, with 
all available instruments for active labour market policies. Thus, for this group, the 
impact evaluation allows us to compare the support from LOs to the support 
provided by private agencies. The positive effect of the contracted-out services 
compared to that of normal public services is not obvious within this group. 
 
The results contribute to the understanding of how likely people from disadvantaged 
groups (profile III) are to succeed in the labour market. It appears that assuming 
their little potential and not offering them help is not efficient. The programme 
proved that for groups categorized by LOs as having a little chance of success in 
finding employment, private contractors get results. This group does not respond to 
standard ALMP instruments; instead it needs to be guided in a non-standard way 
towards finding suitable employment. This might be a group for which proper 
counselling provides a chance of returning to legal employment. It would appear that 
with this group the authorities decided to “cut their losses” prematurely. 
 
Moreover, this paper should be important for stakeholders in two general respects. 
First, it shows how powerful (and doable) RCT evaluation is on the labour market, 
where programme evaluations are usually limited to before-and-after comparisons or 
even focus on input data only, e.g., a list of services provided. Second, it shows that 
the Ministry in Poland suspended a highly effective programme, basing its decision 
on a misleading report that cannot be considered an evaluation. This paper 
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demonstrates that finding effective programmes in active labour market policies is 
possible, but requires careful evaluation using RCTs or at least counterfactual, quasi-
experimental methods. Without these, public decisions can turn out to be wrong and 
lead to the closure of effective programmes, and investment in programmes that do 
not provide any effective support for those in need. 
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